As the supreme law of the United States, the United States Constitution sets forth general rules, which the U.S. Supreme Court interprets and applies to cases brought before it, striking down laws and government actions that it holds to be unconstitutional, and its decisions become law. Click a constitutional provision below to explore landmark cases that interpret it, and learn more at supremecourt.gov, justia.com, oyez.org and the Constitution Annotated. Scroll down for links to federal and California statutes, jury instructions and case law.
The Bill of Rights
When the 1788 Constitution was offered to the states for ratification, anti-Federalists demanded a Bill of Rights to protect individual liberties, echoing protections in the Virginia Declaration of Rights, the Magna Carta, the Petition of Right, and the English Bill of Rights.
Elbridge Gerry (MA), and Patrick Henry, Richard Henry Lee, and George Mason (VA), refused to sign the Constitution without a proper Bill of Rights, so James Madison drafted the first 19 amendments to the Constitution, of which Congress passed 12, and the states ratified 10, which became known as the Bill of Rights, in 1791.
The First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments have been the subject of extensive litigation in criminal courts. After the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, and its due process guarantee, written to apply to state governments, has also been the subject of extensive litigation in criminal courts.
Article I – Legislative Branch
Article I, Section 8
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;
To borrow money on the credit of the United States;
To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes;
To establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States;
To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin, and fix the standard of weights and measures;
To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States;
To establish post offices and post roads;
To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries;
To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court;
To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations;
To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water;
To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years;
To provide and maintain a navy;
To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces;
To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;
To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular states, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings;--And
To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.
Article I, Section 9
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.
No bill of attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.
Article II – Executive Branch
The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.
Article III – Judicial Branch
Section 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
Section 2. The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the state where the said crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any state, the trial shall be at such place or places as the Congress may by law have directed.
Section 3. Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court. The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason, but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture except during the life of the person attainted.
Article IV – States, Citizenship, New States
Article V – Amendment Process
Article VI – Debts, Supremacy, Oaths, Religious Tests
Article VII – Ratification
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.
No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
The Electors shall meet in their respective states and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate; -- the President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted; -- The person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the Vice-President shall act as President, as in case of the death or other constitutional disability of the President.-- The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States.
Section 1
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
Section 1
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
Section 3
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
Section 4
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.
Section 5
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution protects several fundamental rights, including freedom of speech, religion, press, assembly, and petition. It is one of the core components of the Bill of Rights, adopted in 1791. The First Amendment's protections have been interpreted and expanded through various landmark Supreme Court cases over the years to balance individual rights with societal interests.
Schenck v. United States (1919) Established the "clear and present danger" test, determining that speech can be restricted if it poses a significant threat to national security.
Gitlow v. New York (1925) The First Amendment applies to the states and does not prevent the government from punishing political speech that directly advocates its violent overthrow.
Near v. Minnesota (1931) Prior restraints on speech are generally unconstitutional, such as when they forbid the publication of malicious, scandalous, and defamatory content.
Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969) Refined the "clear and present danger" standard to the "imminent lawless action" test, protecting speech unless it incites immediate illegal activity.
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (1969) Affirmed students' right to free speech in schools as long as it does not disrupt educational activities.
Engel v. Vitale (1962) Prohibited state-sponsored prayer in public schools, reinforcing the separation of church and state.
Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) 3-prong test for Establishment Clause violations (supplemented by tests in Lee v. Weisman (1992) and Van Orden v. Perry (2005)).
the statute must have a secular legislative purpose
its principal or primary effect must neither promote nor inhibit religion; and
it must not foster “excessive government entanglement with religion
Employment Division v. Smith (1990) Held that neutral laws of general applicability do not violate the Free Exercise Clause, even if they incidentally burden religious practices.
Near v. Minnesota (1931) Recognized that prior restraint (government censorship before publication) is generally unconstitutional, solidifying press freedom.
New York Times Co. v. United States (1971) Upheld the press's right to publish the Pentagon Papers, asserting that prior restraint requires a heavy burden of proof from the government to show national security risks.
DeJonge v. Oregon (1937) Held states may not violate the right of peaceable assembly
NAACP v. Patterson (1958) Protected the NAACP's right to assemble and associate freely, ruling that the state could not force the organization to disclose its membership lists.
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.
United States v. Cruikshank (1876) - The Second Amendment restricts only the national government.
Presser v. Illinois (1886) - State legislatures may enact statutes to control and regulate organizations, drilling, and parading of military bodies and associations, except those authorized by US militia laws.
United States v. Miller (1939) - Supreme Court adopted the Collective Rights Theory, holding that Congress could prohibit a sawed-off shotgun because it was unrelated to a militia.
Lewis v. U.S. (1980) - Congress could conclude that any felony conviction, even an invalid conviction, is sufficient to prohibit the possession of a firearm.
District of Columbia v. Heller (2008) - The Court held that the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to keep and bear arms for self-defense, unconnected with a militia.
McDonald v. Chicago (2010) - The Court held the right to bear arms for self-defense is fundamental and applies to the states.
Caetano v. Massachusetts (2016) - The Second Amendment covers arms that were not in existence at the time of the founding, and this Second Amendment right applies to the states.
New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n Inc. v. Bruen (2022) - The Court rejected the government’s subjective test for individuals’ need to carry a firearm in public.
No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures by the governmen and establishes warrant requirements. In cases involving the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court has worked to strike a balance between individual privacy and the needs of law enforcement, evolving with societal changes and technological advancements.
Weeks v. United States (1914) Court created the federal Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule
Carroll v. United States (1925) Established the automobile exception to the warrant requirement
Olmstead v. United States (1928) Court held wiretapping was not a Fourth Amendment search or seizure because there was no trespass or physical examination of one's person, papers, houses, or effects
Wolf v. Colorado (1949) Court declined to impose Exclusionary Rule on the states
Mapp v. Ohio (1961) Court applied Exclusionary Rule to the states
Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) Court inferred a right to privacy from several amendments in the Bill of Rights
Katz v. United States (1967) Fourth Amendment protects privacy, not places
Chimel v. California (1969) Defined the scope of a search incident to arrest
Terry v. Ohio (1968) Police with reasonable and articulable suspicion may stop and frisk
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte (1973) Clarified standards for consent searches
Scott v. United States (1978) Police must minimize wiretaps to focus on criminal activity
Illinois v. Gates (1983) Adopted the "totality of the circumstances" approach for probable cause, including the use of anonymous informants
Kyllo v. United States (2001) Protected against warrantless thermal imaging of a home
Riley v. California (2014) Required warrants for cell phone searches incident to arrest
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
The Fifth Amendment provides several protections for individuals within the criminal justice system, including the right against self-incrimination, protection against double jeopardy, the right to due process, and the requirement for just compensation when private property is taken for public use.
GRAND JURY
Hurtado v. California (1884) The right to a grand jury does not apply to the states.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Blockburger v. United States (1932) Defined the test for double jeopardy, focusing on whether each charged offense requires proof of an additional fact that the other does not
Benton v. Maryland (1969) The Double Jeopardy Clause is a fundamental right, which applies to the states.
SELF-INCRIMINATION
Brown v. Mississippi (1936) No physical abuse allowed
Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) Right to attorney during interrogation
Malloy v. Hogan (1964): Incorporated the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination to the states
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) Suspect in custody must be advised of rights before interrogation
Harris v. New York (1971) Impeachment exception to Miranda
Edwards v. Arizona (1981) Once an attorney is requested, all questioning must cease
Nix v. Williams (1984) Inevitable discovery exception to Miranda
New York v. Quarles (1984) Public safety exception to Miranda
Moran v. Burbine (1986) Intelligent and knowing waiver defined
Pennsylvania v. Muniz (1990) Routine booking exception to Miranda rights
Fulminante v. Arizona (1991) No extreme psychological manipulation allowed
Davis v. United States (1994) Request for attorney must be unequivocal to stop interrogation
United States v. Patane (2004) Failure to provide Miranda warnings did not justify exclusion of non-testimonial, physical evidence
Salinas v. Texas (2013) One who desires protection against self-incrimination must explicitly claim that protection, not simply remain mute during questioning
JUST COMPENSATION
Kelo v. City of New London (2005) Held that the government could use eminent domain to transfer land from one private owner to another to further economic development, under the Takings Clause
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
TRIAL: SPEEDY
Klopfer v. North Carolina (1967) The right to speedy trial applies to the states
Betterman v. Montana (2016) The right to speedy trial does not apply once a defendant has been found guilty at trial or has pleaded guilty to criminal charges.
TRIAL: JURY
Ramos v. Louisiana (2020) The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, incorporated to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, requires a unanimous verdict to convict a defendant of a serious offense.
RIGHT TO NOTICE
Touby v. United States (1991) Congress can delegate to the Attorney General, and the Attorney General to the DEA, authority to temporarily add drugs that pose an imminent public health risk to schedules of the Controlled Substances Act.
CONFRONTATION
Crawford v. Washington (2004) The Confrontation Clause bars admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear in court in that matter, unless:
the witness was unavailable to testify; and
the defense had a prior opportunity for cross-examination (e.g., in a preliminary hearing).
Davis v. Washington (2006) 911 call declared non-testimonial, thus admissible
Bullcoming v. New Mexico (2011) An out-of-court testimonial statement may not be admitted against the defendant at trial unless the out-of-court declarant is unavailable, and the defendant has had a prior opportunity to confront that declarant.
Michigan v. Bryant (2011) Identification and description of a shooter and shooting location were not testimonial statements for Confrontation Clause purposes as their primary purpose was to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.
Samia v. United States (2023) The Confrontation Clause need not exclude a non-testifying co-defendant’s confession when modified to avoid identifying the non-confessing co-defendant, plus a jury instruction to consider the confession only regarding the confessing co-defendant.
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) The right to counsel applies during the “critical stage” between arrest and indictment
Massiah v. United States (1964) Interrogating a represented defendant in the absence of counsel after criminal proceedings have begun violates the right to counsel
Edwards v. Arizona (1981) Once a request for counsel has been made, no further interrogation may occur until counsel has been made available, unless the subject initiates further conversations with the police
Brewer v. Williams (1977) Interrogation defined to include officer actions reasonably designed to elicit incriminating information (the “Christian burial speech” in this case)
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
Schilb v. Kuebel (1971) No strict enforcement, but USSC held it is “assumed” to apply to the states
Timbs v. Indiana (2019) Forfeiture of Land Rover deemed an "excessive fine" for state crime
Furman v. Georgia (1972) Death penalty out for arbitrary application
Gregg v. Georgia (1976) Death penalty back with bifurcated trial: 1. Guilt phase + 2. Penalty phase
Woodson v. North Carolina (1976) No mandatory death penalty for 1st Degree Murder
Coker v. Georgia (1977) Death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment for adult rape
Ford v. Wainwright (1986) Cruel and unusual to execute inmate who lost sanity post-sentencing
Ring v. Arizona (2002) Juries decide facts, including death penalty aggravating factors
Atkins v. Virginia (2002) Death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment for mentally ill
Schriro v. Summerlin (2004) Apprendi & Ring (jury to decide enhancers & death) are not retroactive
Roper v. Simmons (2005) No death penalty for offenders who were under 18 at time of crime
Deck v. Missouri (2005) No shackles for defendant in a capital trial unless necessary
Baze v. Rees (2008) “Kentucky cocktail” lethal injection is not wanton torture, lingering
Kennedy v. Louisiana (2008) Death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment for child rape
Madison v. Alabama (2019) State cannot execute one who cannot rationally understand why
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
The Electors shall meet in their respective states and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate; -- the President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted; -- The person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the Vice-President shall act as President, as in case of the death or other constitutional disability of the President.-- The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States.
Section 1
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
Section 1
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
Section 3
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
Section 4
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.
Section 5
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
CITIZENSHIP CLAUSE
Broadly defines "citizen" as a person born or naturalized in the US and subject to its jurisdiction
Reaction to Dred Scott v. Sandford (1856), which had held former slaves and their descendants could not be US citizens
US v. Wong Kim Ark (1898) Chinese man born to permanent resident aliens in the US deemed to have birthright citizenship
PRIVILEGES & IMMUNITIES CLAUSE
All US citizens get all privileges and immunities of US citizenship (rarely litigated)
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
All persons are entitled to procedural fairness from the government:
receive notice of criminal conduct
are provided with a reasonably clear statement of what is prohibited
are not unfairly deprived of life, liberty, or property
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
All persons in a US jurisdiction get equal protection of its laws
Brown v. Board of Education (1954) overturned Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) "separate but equal" standard
Three levels of scrutiny:
Rational Basis
Intermediate Scrutiny
Strict Scrutiny
Section 1
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
Section 2
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.
This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part of the Constitution.
Section 1
After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.
Section 2
The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
Section 3
This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress.
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
Section 1
The terms of the President and the Vice President shall end at noon on the 20th day of January, and the terms of Senators and Representatives at noon on the 3d day of January, of the years in which such terms would have ended if this article had not been ratified; and the terms of their successors shall then begin.
Section 2
The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall begin at noon on the 3d day of January, unless they shall by law appoint a different day.
Section 3
If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of the President, the President elect shall have died, the Vice President elect shall become President. If a President shall not have been chosen before the time fixed for the beginning of his term, or if the President elect shall have failed to qualify, then the Vice President elect shall act as President until a President shall have qualified; and the Congress may by law provide for the case wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice President elect shall have qualified, declaring who shall then act as President, or the manner in which one who is to act shall be selected, and such person shall act accordingly until a President or Vice President shall have qualified.
Section 4
The Congress may by law provide for the case of the death of any of the persons from whom the House of Representatives may choose a President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them, and for the case of the death of any of the persons from whom the Senate may choose a Vice President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them.
Section 5
Sections 1 and 2 shall take effect on the 15th day of October following the ratification of this article.
Section 6
This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission.
Section 1
The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby repealed.
Section 2
The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.
Section 3
This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by conventions in the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress.
Section 1
No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice, and no person who has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more than two years of a term to which some other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of the President more than once. But this Article shall not apply to any person holding the office of President when this Article was proposed by the Congress, and shall not prevent any person who may be holding the office of President, or acting as President, during the term within which this Article becomes operative from holding the office of President or acting as President during the remainder of such term.
Section 2
This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission to the States by the Congress.
Section 1
The District constituting the seat of Government of the United States shall appoint in such manner as Congress may direct:
A number of electors of President and Vice President equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the District would be entitled if it were a State, but in no event more than the least populous State; they shall be in addition to those appointed by the States, but they shall be considered, for the purposes of the election of President and Vice President, to be electors appointed by a State; and they shall meet in the District and perform such duties as provided by the twelfth article of amendment.
Section 2
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
Section 1
The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay poll tax or other tax.
Section 2
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
Section 1
In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.
Section 2
Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.
Section 3
Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President.
Section 4
Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive department or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session. If the Congress, within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, within twenty-one days after Congress is required to assemble, determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office.
Section 1
The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age.
Section 2
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
No law, varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall have intervened.
Fourth Amendment (searches, seizures, warrants, exclusionary rule, special needs)
Weeks v. United States (1914)
Evidence obtained through a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible in federal criminal prosecutions (federal exclusionary rule).
Carroll v. United States (1925)
Automobiles may be searched without a warrant if officers have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a crime (automobile exception).
Olmstead v. United States (1928)*
Wiretapping accomplished without physical trespass does not constitute a Fourth Amendment search (later overruled by Katz).
Brinegar v. United States (1949)
Probable cause exists when facts and circumstances known to officers are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in believing that an offense is being or has been committed.
Wolf v. Colorado (1949)*
The Fourth Amendment applies to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, but the federal exclusionary rule does not (later overruled on the remedy by Mapp).
United States v. Rabinowitz (1950)
A warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest is permissible if reasonable in scope (later limited by Chimel).
Silverman v. United States (1961)
Unauthorized physical penetration into a constitutionally protected area violates the Fourth Amendment, even if minimal.
Mapp v. Ohio (1961)
The exclusionary rule applies to the states; evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is inadmissible in state criminal proceedings.
Katz v. United States (1967)
The Fourth Amendment protects people, not places; a search occurs when the government violates a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Camara v. Municipal Court (1967)
Administrative searches of private residences generally require a warrant, which may be based on reasonable legislative or administrative standards.
McCray v. Illinois (1967)
The Constitution does not require disclosure of a confidential informant’s identity at a pretrial probable-cause hearing when officers testify to reliability and act in good faith.
Terry v. Ohio (1968)
Police may conduct a brief investigatory stop and limited protective frisk when they have reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot and the person is armed and dangerous.
Chimel v. California (1969)
A search incident to arrest is limited to the arrestee’s person and the area within immediate control (the “lunge area”).
United States v. United States District Court (Keith) (1972)
The Fourth Amendment requires a warrant for electronic surveillance in domestic security matters; the President’s national-security power does not create an exception.
United States v. Robinson (1973)
A full search of the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest is reasonable and requires no additional justification.
Cady v. Dombrowski (1973)
The community-caretaking exception permits certain warrantless vehicle searches that serve public-safety rather than criminal-investigation purposes.
United States v. Watson (1976)
A warrantless public arrest is valid if supported by probable cause; no warrant is required for arrests in public places.
Arkansas v. Sanders (1979)
The warrantless search of a closed container found in a vehicle is generally not justified solely by the automobile exception (later limited by Ross and Acevedo).
Smith v. Maryland (1979)
Installation of a pen register to record dialed numbers is not a Fourth Amendment search because individuals have no reasonable expectation of privacy in numbers voluntarily conveyed to the phone company (third-party doctrine).
Payton v. New York (1980)
The Fourth Amendment prohibits warrantless entry into a home to make a routine felony arrest absent consent or exigent circumstances.
Robbins v. California (1981)*
Closed containers in vehicles generally require a warrant (plurality; later effectively overruled by Ross and Acevedo).
United States v. Ross (1982)
If police have probable cause to search a vehicle, they may search any containers within it that might conceal the object of the search.
Illinois v. Gates (1983)
The rigid two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test for infomants is abandoned; probable cause is determined by the totality of the circumstances.
Massachusetts v. Upton (1984)
Probable cause is evaluated under the totality-of-the-circumstances standard; reviewing courts defer to the magistrate if there is a substantial basis for the warrant.
United States v. Leon (1984)
Evidence obtained in reasonable good-faith reliance on a search warrant is admissible even if the warrant is later found invalid (good-faith exception).
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Association (1989)
Government-mandated drug and alcohol testing of railroad employees in safety-sensitive positions is reasonable under the special-needs exception without individualized suspicion.
National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab (1989)
Mandatory drug testing of Customs employees seeking positions involving drug interdiction or firearms is reasonable under the special-needs exception.
Maryland v. Buie (1990)
Officers may conduct a limited protective sweep of a home incident to arrest when they have reasonable suspicion that the area harbors a dangerous individual.
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz (1990)
Highway sobriety checkpoints that briefly stop all vehicles are reasonable when the state’s public safety interest in preventing drunk driving outweighs the minimal intrusion.
California v. Acevedo (1991)
Police may search a container in a vehicle without a warrant if they have probable cause to believe it contains contraband, even without probable cause as to the vehicle as a whole.
Wilson v. Arkansas (1995)
The common-law knock-and-announce principle is part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry.
Vernonia School District v. Acton (1995)
Random drug testing of student athletes is a reasonable search under the special-needs exception.
Chandler v. Miller (1997)
A drug-testing requirement for candidates for state office that is not justified by a special need beyond ordinary law enforcement violates the Fourth Amendment.
Minnesota v. Carter (1998)
Short-term visitors for purely commercial purposes lack a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises and cannot claim Fourth Amendment protection.
Florida v. J.L. (2000)
An anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun, without more, does not provide reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop and frisk.
Indianapolis v. Edmond (2000)
Vehicle checkpoints whose primary purpose is crime control violate the Fourth Amendment.
Illinois v. McArthur (2001)
A temporary seizure of a residence (preventing entry) while officers obtain a warrant is reasonable when supported by probable cause and limited in duration.
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista (2001)
The Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless arrest for a minor criminal offense, including a misdemeanor punishable only by a fine, if supported by probable cause.
United States v. Drayton (2002)
Police need not inform citizens of their right to refuse consent; voluntariness is determined by the totality of the circumstances.
Board of Education v. Earls (2002)
Mandatory drug testing of students participating in competitive extracurricular activities is reasonable under the special-needs exception.
United States v. Banks (2003)
The reasonableness of the wait time after knocking and announcing is judged by the totality of the circumstances, including the risk of evidence destruction.
Illinois v. Caballes (2005)
A exterior dog sniff conducted during a lawful traffic stop that does not prolong the stop is not a Fourth Amendment search.
Georgia v. Randolph (2006)
A physically present co-occupant’s express refusal of consent renders a warrantless search of a shared dwelling unreasonable as to that person.
Brendlin v. California (2007)
A passenger in a vehicle stopped by police is seized under the Fourth Amendment and may challenge the stop.
Arizona v. Gant (2009)
Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance, or if it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.
Herring v. United States (2009)
The exclusionary rule does not apply to isolated police negligence attenuated from the arrest, as opposed to systemic error or reckless disregard.
Safford Unified School District v. Redding (2009)
A school strip search of a student requires reasonable suspicion of contraband that poses a danger.
United States v. Jones (2012)
The government’s attachment of a GPS device to a vehicle and its use to track movements constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.
Florida v. Jardines (2013)
Use of a trained narcotics-detection dog to investigate a home and its curtilage is a Fourth Amendment search.
Maryland v. King (2013)
Taking and analyzing a DNA cheek swab from an arrestee booked for a serious offense is a reasonable booking procedure under the Fourth Amendment.
Riley v. California / United States v. Wurie (2014)
Police generally may not search the digital contents of a cell phone incident to arrest without a warrant.
Navarette v. California (2014)
An anonymous 911 tip of reckless driving can, under the circumstances, provide reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop.
Fernandez v. California (2014)
An occupant’s prior objection to a search does not remain effective after the objecting occupant is no longer present; a remaining co-occupant’s consent is valid.
Collins v. Virginia (2018)
The automobile exception does not permit a warrantless entry onto the curtilage of a home to search a vehicle.
Byrd v. United States (2018)
A person in lawful possession and control of a rental car has a reasonable expectation of privacy even if not listed on the rental agreement.
Utah v. Strieff (2016)
Evidence obtained after an unlawful stop is admissible if discovery of a valid arrest warrant attenuates the taint under the attenuation doctrine.
Birchfield v. North Dakota (2016)
The Fourth Amendment permits warrantless breath tests incident to a DUI arrest but generally requires a warrant for blood tests.
Mitchell v. Wisconsin (2019)
When a driver is unconscious and cannot be given a breath test, the exigent-circumstances exception almost always permits a warrantless blood test.
Caniglia v. Strom (2021)
The community-caretaking exception does not extend to the home; warrantless entry into a home requires an exception such as exigency or consent.
Fifth Amendment (self-incrimination, confessions, immunity)
Hopt v. Utah (1884)
A confession is admissible if it is voluntary and not obtained by inducements, threats, or improper influence.
Counselman v. Hitchcock (1892)
The Fifth Amendment privilege applies to grand-jury proceedings and protects against any disclosure that might tend to incriminate; limited immunity is insufficient.
Brown v. Mississippi (1936)
Confessions obtained by physical torture and brutality violate due process and are inadmissible.
Quinn v. United States (1955)
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is available to witnesses before congressional committees.
Ullmann v. United States (1956)
A grant of immunity coextensive with the Fifth Amendment privilege is constitutional and may compel testimony.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966)
Prior to custodial interrogation, a suspect must be warned of the right to remain silent, that statements may be used against him, and the right to an attorney; waiver must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
Harris v. New York (1971)
A statement obtained in violation of Miranda may be used for impeachment if the defendant testifies inconsistently, provided the statement was voluntary.
Kastigar v. United States (1972)
Use-and-derivative-use immunity is coextensive with the Fifth Amendment privilege and is sufficient to compel testimony.
Rhode Island v. Innis (1980)
Interrogation under Miranda includes words or actions by police that they should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.
Berkemer v. McCarty (1984)
Miranda warnings are not required during a routine traffic stop; custody begins when freedom is curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest.
New York v. Quarles (1984)
There is a public-safety exception to Miranda allowing questions reasonably prompted by a concern for public safety.
Oregon v. Elstad (1985)
A subsequent warned statement is admissible if voluntary; a prior unwarned statement does not automatically taint it under a “fruit of the poisonous tree” analysis for Miranda violations.
Dickerson v. United States (2000)
Miranda is a constitutional decision that cannot be overruled by an Act of Congress; § 3501 is unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to overrule Miranda.
Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010)
A suspect must unambiguously invoke the right to remain silent; a waiver of Miranda rights can be inferred from the totality of the circumstances.
Sixth Amendment (right to counsel, confrontation, jury trial, fair trial procedures)
Powell v. Alabama (1932)
In a capital case, due process requires effective assistance of counsel; appointment on the day of trial is inadequate.
Johnson v. Zerbst (1938)
In federal court, the Sixth Amendment requires appointment of counsel for indigent defendants unless there is a competent, intelligent waiver.
Hamilton v. Alabama (1961)
The right to counsel attaches at critical stages; arraignment in a capital case is a critical stage requiring counsel.
Gideon v. Wainwright (1963)
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is fundamental and applies to the states; states must provide counsel to indigent defendants charged with felonies.
Douglas v. California (1963)
An indigent defendant is entitled to the assistance of counsel on the first appeal as of right.
Brady v. Maryland (1963)
Suppression by the prosecution of material evidence favorable to the accused violates due process.
Escobedo v. Illinois (1964)
When a suspect becomes the focus of investigation and requests counsel, the right to counsel attaches and interrogation may not continue without counsel (foreshadowing Miranda).
Massiah v. United States (1964)
The Sixth Amendment is violated when government agents deliberately elicit incriminating statements from a defendant after the right to counsel has attached, without counsel or a waiver.
United States v. Wade (1967)
A post-indictment lineup is a critical stage at which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies.
Argersinger v. Hamlin (1972)
No person may be imprisoned for any offense unless represented by counsel at trial (or a valid waiver).
Kirby v. Illinois (1972)
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel at identification procedures attaches only after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings.
Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973)
There is no absolute right to counsel at probation- or parole-revocation hearings; counsel is required case-by-case when fundamental fairness demands it.
Faretta v. California (1975)
The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to self-representation if the decision is knowing and intelligent.
Brewer v. Williams (1977)
Once the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has attached, deliberate elicitation of incriminating statements without counsel or waiver violates that right.
Scott v. Illinois (1979)
Appointment of counsel for an indigent defendant is required only when the conviction actually results in a sentence of imprisonment.
Strickland v. Washington (1984)
Ineffective assistance of counsel requires showing both deficient performance (below an objective standard of reasonableness) and prejudice (a reasonable probability of a different result).
Pennsylvania v. Finley (1987)
There is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in state post-conviction collateral proceedings.
Lockhart v. Fretwell (1993)
Prejudice under Strickland is not established merely by deprivation of a windfall or advantage the law no longer recognizes; the focus is on fundamental fairness and reliability.
McFarland v. Scott (1994)
A capital defendant is entitled to appointment of counsel for federal habeas corpus proceedings under the relevant statute once a formal request is made.
Crawford v. Washington (2004)
The Confrontation Clause bars admission of testimonial out-of-court statements unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.
Davis v. Washington (2006) / Hammon v. Indiana (2006)
Statements are nontestimonial when the primary purpose is to enable police to meet an ongoing emergency; they are testimonial when the primary purpose is to establish past events for potential prosecution.
Kansas v. Ventris (2009)
Statements obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel may be used for impeachment even if inadmissible in the case-in-chief.
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009)
Forensic laboratory reports created for criminal prosecution are testimonial; the analysts are witnesses subject to the Confrontation Clause.
Montejo v. Louisiana (2009)
A defendant may waive the Sixth Amendment right to counsel even after it has attached; Michigan v. Jackson’s presumption is overruled.
Maryland v. Shatzer (2010)
A break in custody of 14 days or more ends the Edwards presumption against subsequent waiver of the right to counsel.
Michigan v. Bryant (2011)
Whether statements are testimonial depends on the primary purpose of the interrogation, assessed objectively; statements to meet an ongoing emergency can be nontestimonial.
Ohio v. Clark (2015)
Statements of young children to teachers about abuse are generally nontestimonial because the primary purpose is child protection, not creating evidence for prosecution.
Ramos v. Louisiana (2020)
The Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, as incorporated against the states, requires a unanimous verdict to convict of a serious offense.
Edwards v. Vannoy (2021)
The Ramos jury-unanimity rule does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review.
Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual punishment, excessive fines, death penalty, proportionality)
Weems v. United States (1910)
A punishment that is grossly disproportionate to the offense violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments.
Robinson v. California (1962)
A statute that criminalizes the status of narcotic addiction inflicts cruel and unusual punishment.
Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968)
Prospective jurors may not be excluded for cause merely because of general objections or objections to the death penalty.
Furman v. Georgia (1972)
The death penalty as administered under statutes allowing unguided jury discretion constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
Gregg v. Georgia (1976)
The death penalty is not per se cruel and unusual; statutes providing guided discretion, bifurcation, and appellate review can satisfy the Eighth Amendment.
Woodson v. North Carolina (1976)
Mandatory death sentences that preclude individualized consideration of the offender and the offense violate the Eighth Amendment.
Roberts v. Louisiana (1977)
Mandatory death-penalty statutes that do not allow individualized consideration of mitigating circumstances are unconstitutional.
Coker v. Georgia (1977)
The death penalty is grossly disproportionate and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment for the rape of an adult woman.
Rummel v. Estelle (1980)
A life sentence under a recidivist statute for repeated nonviolent property offenses does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
Solem v. Helm (1983)
A life sentence without parole for a nonviolent habitual offender can be so disproportionate as to violate the Eighth Amendment.
McCleskey v. Kemp (1987)
A statistical study showing racial disparities in capital sentencing does not, without more, demonstrate a constitutional violation in a particular case.
Harmelin v. Michigan (1991)
A mandatory life sentence without parole for possession of a large quantity of cocaine does not violate the Eighth Amendment; there is only a narrow proportionality principle.
Morgan v. Illinois (1992)
A capital defendant may challenge for cause any prospective juror who would automatically impose the death penalty upon conviction.
Felker v. Turpin (1996)
AEDPA’s restrictions on successive habeas petitions do not unconstitutionally suspend the writ of habeas corpus or oust the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction.
Shafer v. South Carolina (2001)
When the alternative to death is life without parole, due process requires that the jury be informed of that fact if future dangerousness is at issue.
Atkins v. Virginia (2002)
The execution of a person with intellectual disability constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
Ring v. Arizona (2002)
The Sixth Amendment requires that aggravating factors necessary for a death sentence be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
Ewing v. California (2003)
California’s three-strikes law as applied to a defendant with a serious criminal history does not violate the Eighth Amendment.
Roper v. Simmons (2005)
The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the death penalty for offenders who were under 18 at the time of their crimes.
Kansas v. Marsh (2006)
A capital-sentencing scheme that imposes death when aggravating and mitigating circumstances are in equipoise does not violate the Eighth Amendment.
Kennedy v. Louisiana (2008)
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the death penalty for the rape of a child where the crime did not result in the victim’s death.
Graham v. Florida (2010)
The Eighth Amendment prohibits a life-without-parole sentence for a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide.
Hall v. Florida (2014)
A rigid IQ cutoff of 70 that fails to account for the standard error of measurement violates the Eighth Amendment’s ban on executing persons with intellectual disability.
Glossip v. Gross (2015)
To challenge a method of execution under the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must show both a substantial risk of serious harm and a known, available alternative that significantly reduces the risk.
Timbs v. Indiana (2019)
The Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause is incorporated against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.
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